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For at least the past seventy years, courts and commentators have recognized
that closely held corporations did not fit easily into general corporation statutes
designed for more widely held firms. The resulting statutory and common law
"trend toward ... treatment of the close corporation as sui generis"' has been
both applauded and well chronicled. The development of a recognized body of
close corporation law has been driven primarily by the desire to protect minority
shareholders from "oppression."2 These goals have manifested themselves in a
variety of legislative enactments and judicial opinions recognizing the validity of
shareholder agreements, voting arrangements, management structures, and
minority rights to exit the corporation.
Elimination of minority shareholders from close corporations3 by majority
action, however, has taken a different path. By focusing on supposed expectations
and heightened fiduciary duties, the courts have sought to "protect" minority
shareholders from freeze-outs. Although early decisions consistently held that
shareholders in close corporations "cannot be partners inter sese and a corporation
as to the rest of the world,"4 most modern courts and commentators have
concluded that in "important operational aspects, the close corporation is the
functional equivalent of the partnership."5 This conclusion has led to the nearly
* Associate Professor of Law, Ohio Northern University. A.B., 1974, Duke University; J.D., 1977,
University of Michigan. I want to acknowledge my research assistants for 1995-1996, Kristine Hanratty
and Susan Wetzel, for their diligent help in preparing this article.
1. Galler v. Galler, 203 N.E.2d 577, 584 (Ill. 1964).
2. One authority on close corporations has claimed that "[u]nfair treatment of ... minority interests
in ... closely held corporations by persons in control... is so widespread that it is a national business
scandal." F. Hodge O'Neal, Oppression of Minority Shareholders: Protecting Minority Rights, 35 CLEV.
ST. L. REv. 121 (1986-1987) [hereinafter O'Neal, Oppression]. In the words of other observers, "The
question is not simply one of good or bad conduct; it is question of how much exploitation will occur."
J.A.C. Hetherington & Michael P. Dooley, lliquidity and Exploitation: A Proposed Statutory Solution
to the Remaining Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. REV. 1, 35 (1977).
3. Recently some scholars have observed that a simple dichotomy between close and public
corporations distorts reality. Rather, they describe a "continuum" of jointly owned firms. See Charles
R. O'Kelley Jr., Filling Gaps in the Close Corporation Contract: A Transaction Cost Analysis, 87 Nw.
U. L. REv. 216 (1992). These observations have obvious validity, but do not impact the analysis here.
For the definition of close corporation adopted for purposes of this article, see infra notes 12-21 and
accompanying text.
4. Jackson v. Hooper, 75 A. 568, 571 (N.J. 1910).
5. Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 2, at 2; see also Carlos D. Israels, The Close Corporation
and the Law, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 488, 491 (1948) ("The objective of the participants in a close corporation
is to equate the scheme of governance of their enterprise to that of a partnership."). The analogy to
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universally accepted notion that shareholders in close corporations owe fiduciary
duties' to each other similar to the duties partners owe other partners.7 With little
analysis of partnership standards and eerie echoes of the "vested rights"
language,' those duties have frequently been found to limit the ability of majority
shareholders to convert the minority's equity position to cash. In short, while
current law increasingly gives minority stockholders the right to cash in their
investment and exit the enterprise,' the development of special fiduciary duties
for the majority gives the same minority shareholders the right to stay. The effect
has been to give the minority the ability to compel "a continuation of the
association by legal constraint - what was once called 'togetherness by
injunction' - a prospect which scarcely seems a desirable policy goal."' " The
reasoning that leads to a recognition of the necessity of a minority right of exit,
however, dictates acceptance of the majority's right to buy out the minority
without regard to the majority's purpose or motivation."
L Attributes of Close Corporations
Traditional corporate law notions are oriented toward a presumption that
shareholders served a separate and independent function from corporate officers
partnerships also forms. the predicate for Professor Eisenberg's study of corporate decision making.
MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 9-17 (1976). This conclusion, however,
is not without contemporary dissent. Judge Easterbrook, writing for the court in Bagdon v.
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 916 F2d 379, 384 (7th Cir. 1990) asserted: "Corporations are not
partnerships. . . Commercial rules should be predictable; this objective is best served by treating
corporations as what they are .... "
6. J.A.C. Hetherington, Special Characteristics, Problems, and Needs of the Close Corporation,
1969 U. ILL. L.F 1, 28-29; Note, Freezing Out Minority Shareholders, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1630, 1636-37
(1961).
7. See, e.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976); Fought v. Morris,
543 So. 2d 167 (Miss 1989). In many respects, however, this analysis has become circular. For
example, Justice Traynar in considering the potential freeze-out of an at-will partner asserted that a
partner's "fiduciary duties are at least as great as those of a shareholder of a corporation." Page v. Page,
359 P.2d 41, 44 (Cal. 1961).
8. Compare Lewis v. Clark, 911 F2d 1558, 1560 (1Itth Cir. 1990) ("If minority stockholders...
want stock in the merge' corporation, they are entitled to even treatment with all other holders of the like
stock.") with Outwater v Public Serv. Corp., 143 A. 729,731-32 (N.J. Ch. 1928) ("Continued membership,
until dissolution, is an inherent property right in corporate existence ... [o]therwise, a merger would be
a simple medium for a compulsory sale, and that is not permissible.").
9. See, e.g., REV. MODEL Bus. CODE ANN., CLOSE CORP. SUPP. § 43; CAL. CORP. CODE §
1800(b)(5) (West 1990).
10. Hetherington, 'upra note 6, at 29.
It. Both the analogy to partnerships and the right to dissolution on demand have been criticized.
Harry J. Haynsworth, The Effectiveness of Involuntary Dissolution Suits as a Remedy for Close
Corporation Dissension, 35 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 25, 87 n.289 (1987). Acceptance of the criticism,
however, would not diminish the merits of allowing the majority to exercise its statutory right to a cash-
out merger. The notion that the participants made a reasoned choice to incorporate and not to include
a dissolution right intheir charter may limit the application of the partnership analogy. The argument,





and directors." The function of the former is to provide capital while the
function of the latter is primarily management of the corporation. 3 This dual
system does not accurately reflect the typical close corporation in which there is
generally an intimate group of participants who contribute to both the financial
investment in the corporation and the management of the corporation.14
Generally, the shareholders "expect employment and a meaningful role in
management, as well as a return on the money paid for the shares. Further, their
expectations are often complicated by family or other personal relationships
within the corporation."'5 Essential to the success of the enterprise is the "ability
[of the shareholders] to sustain a close, harmonious relationship over time."16
Fifty years ago, Professor Israels lamented that "no satisfactory all-purpose
definition of a close corporation appears ever to have been worked out."'7 In the
time following, a consensus of the characteristics, if not a definition, of what
constitutes a close corporation has developed. In a widely cited opinion, the
Massachusetts Court of Appeals defined a close corporation as one "typified by:
(1) a small number of stockholders; (2) no ready market for the corporate stock;
and (3) substantial majority stockholder participation in the management, direction
and operations of the corporation."'" The leading text in the area of close
corporations limits its definition of the close corporation to those corporations
whose "shares are not generally traded in the securities markets."'9 The Supreme
Court of Ohio also has defined a close corporation as a "corporation with a few
shareholders and whose corporate shares are not generally traded on a securities
market.""0 In short, close working relationships between owners who are actively
involved in the enterprise coupled with the lack of a ready market and the
corresponding illiquidity of the shareholders' investment are fundamental
characteristics which distinguish close corporations from public corporations.2'
12. F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLD-
ERS § 7.02 (2d ed. 1985).
13. Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259,
260-61 (1967).
14. Id. at 278-79; Robert B. Thompson, The Shareholder's Cause of Action for Oppression, 48 Bus.
LAw. 699,702-03 (1993) [hereinafter Thompson, Shareholder's Cause]; Symposium, 52 Nw. U. L. REv.,
345, 346 (1957).
15. Thompson, Shareholder's Cause, supra note 14, at 702.
16. Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 2, at 2.
17. Israels, supra note 5, at 491. Although concluding that "[tihe closely held ... corporation
'problem' will not be resolved partnerships." one recent commentator was "forced to conclude, after
studying virtually any legislative or judicial formulation adopted to define a closely held corporation, that
we are attempting to define a business organization which has already been well defined - that of a
partnership." David E. Roseberry, Traditional Corporate Concepts in Light of Demands for Elastic
Norms for the Family or Closely Held Corporations, 5 J. CORP. L. 455, 478-79 (1980).
18. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.W.2d 505, 511 (Mass. 1975).
19. ONEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 12, § 1.01.
20. Crosby v. Beam, 548 N.E.2d 217, 220 (Ohio 1989).
21. Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 2, at 2-6; Robert B. Thompson, Corporate Dissolution and
Shareholders' Reasonable Expectations, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 193, 215-16 (1988) [hereinafter Thompson,
Corporate Dissolution]; Henry F Johnson, Strict Fiduciary Duty in Close Corporations: A Concept in
19961
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II. Cash-Out Mergers
A cash-out merger' is a merger which forces the minority shareholders to
relinquish their equity in the corporation in exchange for cash or debt securities
while allowing the majority shareholder to retain his equity.' Such transactions,
by definition, "are coercive: Minority stockholders are bound by majority rule to
accept cash or debt in exchange for their common shares .... But this alone
does not render freeze outs objectionable. "U The objection to cash-outs in
closely held corporations lies deeper in the mists of corporate history.
At common law, unanimous shareholder approval was required to approve any
merger.' As a result, cash-out mergers were not only impossible, but a single
shareholder could block a transaction desired by the vast majority of stockhold-
ers.' In order to allow corporations to act in ways beneficial to the majority, the
merger statutes were amended and appraisal rights granted to dissenting
shareholders." In the context of closely held corporations, however, use of
statutorily granted merger powers to cash out the minority interest continued to
be described as "devastating" or as a method to "victimize minority interests.""
As a result, "[e]ven if the flexibility accorded to majority shareholders to run
larger corporations permits them to change the enterprise and cash out minority
shareholders, that flexibility has not been extended to close corporations .... .,29
Indeed, despite the seemingly obvious conclusion that in the face of deadlock or
dissention, there is "reason to facilitate or encourage the departure of one group
or the other from the enterprise,"' several "[clourts have held that merger transac-
tions that are formally authorized by the [applicable statutory] procedures ...
Search of Adoption, 18 CAL. V. L. REv. 1, 1-2 (1982); see also Galler v. Galler, 203 N.E.2d 577, 583-
84 (111 1964).
22. This article uses the term "cash-out merger" to describe these transactions. Most often these
transactions are referred to pejoratively as "freeze-outs" or "squeeze-outs." The implication from these
terms is highly negative and reflects the notion that minority shareholders are somehow mistreated in
these transactions. As the following discussion demonstrates, however, use of statutorily provided
mechanisms to provide liquidity for minority shareholders' investments have come to be the preferred
means of addressing dis!;ension within closely held corporations. Within this context, mergers designed
to eliminate the minority interest at a fair price are not oppressive.
23. Alpert v. 28 Williams St. Corp., 473 N.E.2d 19, 24 n.2 (N.Y. 1984).
24. Victor Brudney & Marvin A. Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.J.
1354, 1357 (1978).
25. Voeller v. Neiston Warehouse Co., 311 U.S. 531, 535 n.6 (1941); William J. Carney,
Fundamental Corporate Changes, Minority Shareholders and Business Purposes, 1980 AM. B. FOUND
RES. J. 69, 78-79.
26. Elliot J. Weiss, The Law of Take Out Mergers: A Historical Perspective, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV.
626-31 (1981).
27. Armstrong v. Marathon Oil Co., 513 N.E.2d 776, 782 (Ohio 1987).
28. F. HODGE O'NEAL & JORDAN DERwIN, ExPULSION OR OPPRESSION OF BUSINESS AssocIATIONS
69, 71 (1961).
29. Thompson, Shareholder's Cause, supra note 14, at 744; see, e.g., Lewis v. Clark, 911 F.2d 1558,
1560 (11th Cir. 1990).




constitute a breach of [fiduciary] duty to minority shareholders where the effect of
the transaction is to eliminate them from further equity participation in the
enterprise."'"
In publicly traded companies, this type of merger has generally come to be
known as a "going private" transaction. 2 Both the volume and magnitude of
these transactions have focused the business and legal communities' attention on
the implications for the minority shareholders in these corporations.33 With some
hesitations,' the courts and legislatures have abandoned the common law notion
of a shareholder's "vested right" to be an owner of a particular corporation and
replaced it with an understanding of the shareholder's position as being simply an
economic one. Thus, the debate over cash-out mergers in public corporations
has centered generally on fairness issues surrounding disclosure and its effect on
valuation and price.36
31. 3 MODEL BUs. CORP. Acr ANN. § 11.01 cmt. 1 (1994). Presumably the majority (if it is a large
enough majority) does retain the ability to voluntarily dissolve the corporation, although the
Donahue/Wilkes standard discussed infra notes 57-65, may bring that into question. See Thompson,
Corporate Dissolution, supra note 21, at 200 n.30. Dissolution, however, is rarely in any shareholder's
best interest; valuation as a going concern is almost always higher than liquidation value. Moreover,
corporate statutes are generally construed to give the majority the power to engage in cash-out mergers
subject to the minority's appraisal rights. Therefore, proponents of preventing minority oppression must
have some rationale, other than the availability of voluntary dissolution, for limiting cash-out mergers.
As will be seen infra, the justifications for protecting minority shareholders also support majority use of
cash-out mergers in closely held corporations.
32. Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 24, at 1365.
33. See, e.g., Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 24, at 1355-56; Kent T. van den Berg, Note,
Approval of Take-out Mergers by Minority Shareholders: From Substantive to Procedural Fairness, 93
YALE L.J. 1113 (1984).
34. See, e.g., Coyne v. Park & Tilford Distillers Corp., 154 A.2d 893 (Del. 1959); Note, Elimination
of Minority Share Interest by Merger: A Dissent, 54 Nw. U. L. REv. 629, 635 (1959) (The "more
flagrant injury inflicted ... is the forced extinguishment of the share interest itself. As the shareholder
is the owner of a unit of interest in the corporation, he possesses the right of ownership ....").
35. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); see Coleman v. Taub, 638 F.2d 628, 634
(3d Cir. 1981) (referring to the doctrine as "the discredited notion that shareholders have a vested right
in corporate participation"). Weiss, supra note 26, at 626-53, traces these developments chronologically.
36. Even though the Delaware test of "entire fairness" for determining the propriety of these
transactions is becoming more widely accepted, see infra note 125 and accompanying text, the courts
have failed to clearly define the term "entire fairness." The concept of "entire fairness" encompasses two
aspects. The substantive sense of entire fairness is fair price and the procedural aspect is fair dealing.
According to the court in Weinberger, the analysis of fair dealing and fair price are not separate tests,
but must be analyzed as a whole. Weinberger clearly states that appraisal is not necessarily a minority
shareholder's sole remedy in Delaware. 457 A.2d at 713. In Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chemical Corp.,
498 A.2d 1099, 1106 (Del. 1985), the court held that an unfair dealing claim, which is based upon
breaches by the majority shareholder of the duties of loyally and care, raise issues which an appraisal
remedy simply cannot address. Therefore, the Delaware Supreme Court held that if a minority
shareholder makes specific allegations of "procedural unfairness" and "unfair dealing" in a freeze-out
merger, these challenging the "entire fairness" of the merger. Id. at 1104-05. According to Weinberger,
fair dealing is meant to be characterize the fiduciary duty owed by the majority shareholders to the
minority shareholders. Note, supra note 33. at 1115.
"Fair dealing" also embraces the duty of the majority shareholder to use complete candor throughout
the transaction. Persinger v. Carmazzi, Sales One, Inc., 441 S.E.2d 646, 652 (V. Va. 1994). The burden
1996]
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Il1. Cash-Out Mergers in Closely Held Corporations
At the same time the law has been providing increased flexibility to the
elimination of minority equity interests in public corporations, the law has been
imposing ever more rigid rules regarding close corporations. Having seized the
analogy to partnerships, the courts have discovered onerous fiduciary duties that
frequently prevent cash-out mergers. Not only is the analogy based on a seriously
flawed understanding of partnership law but also these decisions have radically
altered the nature of the relationship between shareholders in close cor-
porations. 7 All of this has occurred contemporaneously with the adoption of
corporate codes designed to allow the members of close corporations wide latitude
in structuring these relationships. 8
These limitations on majority rule have resulted from judicial concern for the
perceived plight of minority shareholders. The existence of a relatively small
number of shareholders restricts the transfer or alienation of shares and produces
an unavailability of a ready market in which to offer their stock for sale." The
lack of a ready means of withdrawal from the business by disenchanted share-
holders has been thought to make "the problem of exploitation .. .uniquely
related to illiquidity." ° Because he cannot use a market to exit the enterprise and
recover his capital, the minority is vulnerable to a variety of devices that allow
the majority to benefit from the minority's investment without compensating him
rests upon the majority shareholder to show that minority shareholder's decision whether to accept the
merger consideration or to opt for a appraisal. Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 A.2d 840, 846 (Dcl.
1987).
37. Hetherington, supra note 6, at 22-23; Charles W. Murdock, The Evolution of Effective Remedies
for Minority Shareholders and Its Impact Upon Valuation of Minority Shares, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
425, 428-29 (1990).
38. 2 JAMEs D. COX ET AL., CORPORATtONS § 14.16 (1995).
39. This concern for the illiquidity of the minority's investment lies at the root of much of the
commentary and proposed reform. See Hetherington, supra note 6, at 21-23. Shareholders in closed
corporations, unlike investors in publicly traded corporations, become participants in a particular
enterprise, not mere investors seeking the highest return on their investment. See REV. MODEL BUS.
CORP. Act, CLOSE CORP. SUPP. § 11 official cmt. (1993). This participation in management involves
working relationships with other shareholders which parallel the relationships found in partnerships.
Because of the nature of this participation, the transfer of the minority's interest is extremely difficult.
Addressing this concern, however, by limiting the majority's ability to remover the minority, even at a
fair price, is neither wise nor justifiable by any reference to "partnership duties."
40. See Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 2, at 6; see also Thompson, Shareholder's Cause, supra
note 14, at 699. Not all authors are convinced. At least some commentators assert that liquidity is not
the issue and that the risk in closely held businesses is no more, or less, than in public. Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV. 271, 272
(1986). This argument, however, fails to give full effect to the vulnerability of the minority's positioning
a close corporation. See Zenichi Shishido, The Fair Value of Minority Stock in Closely Held




for it.4 "It is this lack of a market that enables those in control to 'freeze-out' the
minority.""
An Ohio Court of Appeals has described these "freeze-out" or "squeeze-out"
devices as the "manipulative use of corporate control to eliminate minority
shareholders, or to reduce their share of voting power or percentage of ownership
of assets, or otherwise unfairly deprive them of advantages or opportunities to
which they are entitled."43 Professor O'Neal defined "squeeze-out" as "the use
by some of the owners or participants in a business enterprise of strategic
position, inside information, or powers of control, or the utilization of some legal
device or technique to eliminate from the enterprise one or more of its owners or
participants."" The vulnerability of the investment of minority shareholders to
majority action caused courts to develop doctrines limiting the ability of the
majority to act.
IV Shareholder Fiduciary Duties and Expectations in Close Corporations
A. Partnership Duties and Shareholder Protection
As a general rule, majority shareholders have long been understood to owe a
fiduciary duty to minority shareholders.45 In the case of a close corporation,
however, "numerous courts have 'borrowed' a rule from partnership law, and have
held that majority shareholders have a heightened fiduciary duty, one of the
utmost good faith and loyalty, to the minority shareholders."' The duty owed
by a majority shareholder to a minority shareholder in a close corporation is
similar to the duty owed by partners in a partnership to one another because "[a]
close corporation is functionally similar to a partnership because of its relatively
informal management structure and the personal relationships that exist between
participants.""
The analogy to partnerships has been used by courts concerned about the plight
of minority shareholders in closely held corporations to transform traditional
corporate norms for majority rule. Relying on this analogy, courts have concluded
41. WP v. Bikon Corp., 669 A.2d 1382, 1385-86 (NJ. 1996); Thompson, Shareholder's Cause,
supra note 14, at 703. The traditional notions of majority abuse share this theme. See O'Neal,
Oppression, supra note 2, at 125-34. Although Professor O'Neal also included cash-out mergers as one
of these vehicles for oppression, id. at 125, he recognized that appraisal rights, at least, "supposedly
mitigate" the danger to the minority, id. at 138. Indeed, appraisal rights operate in much the same fashion
as court-supervised buy-outs in minority suits for dissolution.
42. Murdock, supra note 37, at 437.
43. Estate of Schroer v. Stamco Supply, Inc., 482 N.E.2d 975, 979 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984).
44. O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 12, § 1.01.
45. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306-07 (1939); Southern Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 492
(1919).
46. Gigax v. Repka, 615 N.E.2d 644, 648 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992); see also Frank Lemer & Assoc.,
Inc. v. Vassy, 599 N.E.2d 734, 738 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991); Estate of Schroer v. Stamco Supply, Inc., 482
N.E.2d 975, 981 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984).
47. Gary C. Ivey, Note, Standards of Management Conduct in Close Corporations: A Transactional
Approach, 33 STAN. L. REV. 1141, 1149 (1981).
1996]
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that these entities are merely "incorporated partnerships"" and purported to apply
the fiduciary principles applicable to partners as a shield to protect minority
shareholders. Two decisions of the Massachusetts Supreme Court have provided
the point of departure for these developments.4
In Donahue it Rodd Electrotype Co.," the defendants caused the corporation
to repurchase the shares of a former controlling shareholder. The defendants,
however, refused to make the same offer to minority shareholders, including the
plaintiff. Noting that the "close corporation bears striking resemblance to a
partnership,"'" the court described what it was as "the true plight of the minority
shareholder."52 In the court's view, "the minority stockholders may be trapped in
a disadvantageous situation [because] [n]o outsider would knowingly assume [his]
position." 3 As a i'esult, the minority "cannot easily reclaim his capital."' The
solution, as the court reasoned, was to "hold that stockholders in the close
corporation owe one another substantially the same fiduciary duty in the operation
of the enterprise that partners owe to one another."55 The court described this
duty as one of "utmost good faith and loyalty"56 and concluded that it required
all stockholders be given the same opportunity to sell their shares that had been
given to the controlling shareholder. 7
48. See, e.g., 68th St. Apts., Inv. v. Lauricella, 362 A.2d 78, 84-86 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976);
COX ET AL.. supra note 38, § 14.16; Kelvin H. Dickinson, Partners in a Corporate Cloak: The
Emergence and Legitimacy of the Incorporated Partnership, 33 AM. U. L. REv. 559 (1984); Principles
of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations, 2 A.L.I., § 7.01, cmt. e (1994). The analogy
to partnerships and tern "incorporated partnership," however, is not a particularly recent development.
See Cuppy v. Ward, 176 N.Y.S. 233, 243-45 (1919) (Sheam, J., dissenting).
49. Earlier courts and commentators had drawn analogies to partnerships. See, e.g., Helms v.
Duckworth, 249 F.2d 482, 486-87 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Israels, supra note 5. However, Donahue v. Rodd
Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975), and Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d
657 (Mass. 1976), hav: come to be recognized as the leading cases, Murdock, supra note 37, at 436,
although not without criticism, see FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 245-47 (1991). For other earlier cases, see Larry D. Soderquist,
Reconciling Shareholders' Rights and Corporate Responsibility: Close and Small Public Corporations,
33 VAND. L. REV. 1387, 1403 (1980).
50. 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975).
51. Id. at 512.
52. Id. at 514.
53. Id. at 515.
54. Id. at 514.
55. Id. at 515. The apparent appropriateness of this application of partnership fiduciary duties to the
participants in close corporations had been previously noted by many prominent commentators. See, e.g.,
Manne, supra note 13, at 282 ("There is also a strong fiduciary duty owed one partner by another. These
are essentially the elements desired or needed for close corporations, but none of them is a part of
traditional corporation law.").
56. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 515. Remarkably, although the Uniform Partnership Act (UPA) was
enacted in Massachusetts in 1922 (see MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 108A, § I (Law. Co-op, 1995)), the court
never cited or discusseC its provisions in reaching its conclusion. The new Revised Uniform Partnership
Act (RUPA) § 404(a) "nd (d) is consistent with the court's formulation. The RUPA, however, clearly
allows freeze-outs by termination of the partnership.




The Donahue standard was modified a year later in Wilkes v. Springside
Nursing Home, Inc." In Wilkes, the majority removed the plaintiff as an officer
and director, and the plaintiff claimed that this conduct breached their fiduciary
duty to him. 9 The court asserted that Donahue and Wilkes involved "freeze-
outs"' of minority shareholders and that "the distinction between the majority
action in Donahue and the majority action in this case is more one of form than
of substance."'" The court then went on to note that, because "the majority,
concededly, have certain rights,"'62 the court must determine "whether the control-
ling group can demonstrate a legitimate business purpose for its action."'63 If
there was such a purpose, the court would determine "the practicability of a less
harmful alternative"' to the minority's interest.
The Donahue/Wilkes formulation65 of duty in close corporations has come to
be widely accepted.' For example, in a context similar to Donahue, the Ohio
Supreme Court67 recently held that "controlling shareholders . . . breach their
58. 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976).
59. Id. at 661-62.
60. Id. at 662.
61. Id. at 663.
62. Id.
63. Id. Some earlier writers had described the absence of a business purpose as a prerequisite of a
freeze-out: "The term has come to imply a purpose to force a liquidation or sale of the stockholder's
shares, not incident to some other wholesome business goal." James Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the
Dissenting Stockholder's Appraisal Right, 77 HARv. L. REv. 1189, 1192-93 (1964).
64. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663; see also Zimmerman v. Bogoff, 524 N.E.2d 849, 853 (Mass. 1988).
65. The approach taken in these cases was anticipated and advocated in a student note several years
earlier. See Note, supra note 6, at 1645-47. Donahue and Wilkes, however, are generally viewed as the
source of this enhanced fiduciary duty standard.
66. As one commentator has noted, "Differences as to the scope and meaning of the fiduciary duties
under a Donahue standard do not detract from its widespread acceptance." Thompson, Shareholder's
Cause, supra note 14, at 729; see also Wulf v. Mackey, 899 P.2d 755, 757 (Or. Ct. App. 1995) (quoting
Noakes v. Schoenbom, 841 P.2d 682, 687 (Or. Ct. App. 1992)) ("When the majority shareholders of a
closely held corporation use their control over the corporation to their own advantage and exclude the
minority from the benefits of participating in the corporation, absent a legitimate business purpose, the
actions constitute a breach of their fiduciary duties .... "); Masinter v. Webco Co., 262 S.E.2d 433,
440-41 (NV. Va. 1980) ("Mhe particular type of oppressive conduct.., is the attempt to 'freeze or
squeeze out' a minority shareholder by depriving him, without any legitimate business purpose, of any
benefit from his ownership .... "); Russell v. First York Savings Co., 352 NAV.2d 871, 874 (Neb.
1984) overruled on other grounds, 364 N.W.2d 14 (Neb. 1985) ("Shareholders in a close corporation
owe one another the same fiduciary duty as that owed by one partner to another in a partnership.");
Schwartz v. Marien, 335 N.E.2d 334, 338 (N.Y. 1975) ("[N]ot only must it be shown that it was sought
to achieve a bona fide independent business objective, but as well that such objective could not have
been accomplished substantially as effectively by other means .... ").
67. Crosby v. Beam, 548 N.E.2d 217 (Ohio 1989). One consequence of those direct duties to
minority shareholders is to eliminate the need to bring these claims derivatively. In Crosby, the majority
shareholders argued that minority shareholders could only bring a derivative cation and that the named
plaintiffs had no standing to do so based on the factual circumstances of the case. At the trial level, the
action was dismissed and the court rejected plaintiffs' argument that as to the allegation of breach of
fiduciary duty, plaintiffs should have a direct action against the controlling shareholders. On appeal the
supreme court held that "claims of a breach of fiduciary duty alleged by minority shareholders against
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heightened fiduciary duty to minority shareholders by utilizing their majority
control of the corporation to their own advantage, without providing minority
shareholders with an equal opportunity to benefit."" The articulated rationale for
this holding was acceptance of the "striking resemblance 6 9 of close corporations
to partnerships and the supposed inability of the minority shareholder to escape
from his "disadvantageous situation."7
The effect of this heightened fiduciary duty has been to act as a brake on
majority action. This has been particularly appropriate where the actions have
taken advantage of the unmarketable nature of a minority interest in the
enterprise."' By the time the majority has embarked upon this type of conduct,
however, relations between the participants have broken down severely. As a
result, the minority often prefer to withdraw their investment rather than compel
payment of dividends or return to work in a hostile environment.'
Recognition of this essential character of the relationship should be
the beginning point of close corporation cases. This view immediately
suggests the difficulty, if not impossibility, of regulating or measuring
the conduct of associates toward each other by objective criteria and
the inherent unfairness of denying relief to those who are dissatisfied
with the relationship in the absence of 'unlawful' conduct. Personal
relations may become so unsatisfactory that no amount of commercial
success is adequate recompense. Only the participants can judge when
continuation of an association becomes intolerable. 3
The application of partnership fiduciary duties to close corporations has allowed
courts to require the majority to buy out the minority interest - provide the
shareholders who control a majority of shares in a close corporation, and use their control to deprive
minority shareholders of the benefits of their investment, may be brought as individual or direct actions."
Crosby, 548 N.E.2d at 22.1. The court reasoned that limiting recovery to a derivative remedy in the case
of a freeze-out type of situation would not be an effective remedy because it would allow the wrongdoers
to benefit from their wrongs. Id.; see also PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS, 2 A.L.I. § 7.01(d) (1994).
68. Crosby, 548 N.E.2d at 221; see also Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 460 P.2d 464, 471 (Cal.
1969) ("Majority shareholders may not use their power to control corporate activities to benefit
themselves alone .... Any use to which they put... their power to control the corporation must
benefit all shareholders proportionately.").
69. Crosby, 548 N.l.2d at 220.
70. Id.
71. The development of Donahue/Wilkes fiduciary duty standard has significantly changed the
minority's vulnerability 1o exploitation by loss of use or income from its investments which troubled
Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 2, at 43. See Murdock, supra note 37, at 484-85.
72. Murdock, supra note 37, at 427. The breakdown in the participants' relationship has many
causes. Although description of the problem as "oppression of minority shareholders" tends to focus
attention on the "greed and desire of majority shareholders for absolute power," even the foremost
advocate of minority rights recognizes that this deterioration can also be caused by minority behavior.
O'Neal, Oppression, supra note 2, at 122-23.




missing liquidity - at a court-determined fair price. In Orchard v. Corvelli,74
the plaintiff had been a minority shareholder in a group of McDonald's restaurant
franchises. Through a series of transactions the defendant majority shareholder
was able to acquire the renewal of these franchises individually and exclude the
plaintiff.' Beginning with the proposition that "vulnerability of minority
shareholders in the closely held corporation is well recognized," '76 the court,
following Donahue,' concluded that "the law imposes a fiduciary duty upon the
majority requiring it to act with the utmost good faith and loyalty in transacting
corporate affairs .... [A]ny attempt to 'squeeze out' a minority shareholder must
be viewed as a breach of this fiduciary duty."78 Based upon this breach, the court
ordered the majority to buy out the plaintiffs position.
B. Expectations and the Right To Exit the Enterprise
If the shareholders, either through agreement or charter provision, structure
their relationship to provide for a falling out, the minority could use those
provisions to exit.79 Failure to negotiate these terms, however, leaves the
minority's investment in the enterprise at risk of being retained while the
shareholder receives no return. To address this dilemma, legislatures have
amended their corporation codes to liberalize the grounds for dissolution at the
request of the minority."
The remedy of dissolution has generally been perceived as extraordinarily
harsh.8' Courts have been reluctant to impose dissolution, even with the more
liberal prerequisites for its use. Instead, alternative remedies for dissolution
claims based on "oppression" have developed.82 Although the statutes provide
a variety of possibilities, the preferred remedy has been a court-supervised buy-
out of the minority interests.83 "The increased use of buyouts as a remedy for
deadlock or dissension is the most dramatic recent change in legislative and
judicial thinking on close corporations problems."'
74. 590 F Supp. 1548 (W.D. Pa. 1984), affid, 802 F2d 448 (3d Cir. 1987).
75. Id. at 1551-53.
76. Id. at 1557.
77. Id. at 1559.
78. Id. at 1557.
79. For example, many close corporation statutes now allow for the articles of incorporation to
provide for dissolution at the request of any shareholder. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 355 (1991);
805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2A.50 (West 1993); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2337 (West 1995).
80. F Hodge O'Neal, Close Corporations: Existing Legislation and Recommended Reform, 33 Bus.
LAW. 873, 881-82 (1978) [hereinafter O'Neal, Close Corporations]. Today at least 37 states allow
dissolution at the request of the minority on the ground of "oppression." Thompson, Shareholder's
Cause, supra note 14, at 709.
81. Haynsworth, supra note 11, at 31.
82. Thompson, Corporate Dissolution, supra note 21, at 228-36.
83. Haynsworth, supra note 11, at 53; Murdock, supra note 37, at 470.
84. Thompson, Corporate Dissolution, supra note 21, at 231.
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These claims began as a response to "oppression" of minority shareholders.
5
Recently, however, the necessity of establishing fault on the part of the majority
has been greatly diminished, if not eliminated. "[I]n protecting expectations, the
courts are focusing on the impact on shareholders of acts by those in control of
the corporation, rather than using the traditional approach of searching for
misconduct by those in control." '86 The expectations have been described as "the
most reliable guide to a just solution of a dispute among shareholders ... in the
typical close corporation.""7 Frustration of those expectations, regardless of the
"fault" of the majority, has become grounds for minority exit at a judicially
imposed fair price."
This concept is also derived from the perceived similarity of closely held
entities to partnerships89 and concern for the liquidity of the minority's in-
vestment. In a leading case9 to adopt the reasonable expectation theory, the
court confronted a statute that permitted dissolution when "'reasonably necessary
for the protection of the rights or interests' of the [complaining] shareholders. 92
The court concluded that these rights include the minority shareholder's
"'reasonable expectations' . . . in the corporation."93 Although the court purported
to recognize that "[o]nly expectations embodied in understandings, express or
implied, among the participants should be recognized by the court,"94 these
expectations are very fluid: the determination "will include the 'reasonable
expectations' created at the inception of the participants' relationship; those...
'expectations' as altered over time; and the... 'expectations' which develop as the
participants engage in a course of dealing in conducting the affairs of the
corporation."95
The New York cases serve to illustrate how the "expectations" of minority
shareholders can be used to enhance the liquidity of those interests.96 In In re
Topper,97 the petitioner was a shareholder in two closely held corporations. He
had left a position he had held-for twenty-five years and relocated from Florida
85. Murdock, supre note 37, at 461.
86. O'Neal, Oppresvion, supra note 2, at 142.
87. O'Neal, Close Corporations, supra note 80, at 886.
88. Indeed, frustration of minority expectations has become a vehicle for the minority to force the
majority to sell to the rinority. Muellenberg v. Bikon Corp., 669 A.2d 1382, 1389 (N.J. 1996).
89. See Symposium, supra note 14, at 386; Haynsworth, supra note 11, at 87 n.289 (Breach of the
,enhanced fiduciary duty derived from partnership analogy can also serve as the basis for these oppression
claims.); Thompson, Slhareholder's Cause, supra note 14, at 712.
90. Muellenbergv. Bikon Corp., 669 A.2d 1382, 1386 (N.J. 1996).
91. vleiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 557-58 (N.C. 1983).
92. Id. at 561; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-14-30 (1995).
93. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d at 563.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 563.
96. The concern far liquidity of investment lies at the basis of the reasonable expectation just as
much as it underpins the DonahueWlilkes fiduciary duty approach. See Thompson, Corporate
Dissolution, supra note 21, at 197-99.




to New York to become a shareholder. After a short period of employment with
the corporation, the plaintiff was discharged. He then brought suit for dissolution
of the corporation on grounds of "oppression." Noting that "the relationship
between the stockholders in a close corporation vis-d-vis each other in practice
closely approximates the relationship between partners,""8 the court turned to a
consideration of the parties "expectations" to determine whether the majority's
actions had been oppressive.9 Deciding that "oppressive conduct is distinct from
illegal or fraudulent,"'"4 the court held that "[w]hether the controlling
shareholders discharged petitioner for cause .. .is irrelevant."'' Instead, the
court concluded "that the respondents' actions have severely damaged petitioner's
reasonable expectations . . . ; consequently, they are deemed to be 'oppre-
ssive.""'  As a result, the court was entitled to order a buy-out of the plaintiffs
interest at a price determined by the court.
This approach was endorsed by the New York Court of Appeals in In re Kemp
& Beatley, Inc."3 The petitioners, two shareholders, had resigned from their
long-term employment with the corporation. In response, the majority
shareholders modified the company's dividend policy in a manner that eliminated
any dividends on the petitioners' stock.0 4 Reasoning from the premise that "the
majority shareholders[] [owe a] fiduciary obligation to treat all shareholders fairly
and equally,"' 5 the court (after reviewing the extensive commentary on the
issue) concluded that "utilizing a complaining shareholder's 'reasonable expec-
tations' as a means of identifying and measuring conduct alleged to be oppressive
is appropriate."'0
The court reached this conclusion despite the availability of shareholder
agreements that could have addressed this issue"7 and the recognition that absent
"such an agreement, however, ultimate decision-making power respecting
corporate policy will be reposed in the holders of a majority interest in the
corporation.""'u Nonetheless, apparently because the exercise of majority power
could both "destroy a stockholder's vital interests and expectations"'04 and
because the stockholder had no "reasonable means of withdrawing his or her
98. Id. at 364 (quoting Weiss v. Gordon, 301 N.Y.S.2d 839 (App. Div. 1969)).
99. Id. at 365.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 362. Under a Donahue/Wilkes analysis, however, this issue would be critical. Because
the focus in the fiduciary duty claim is on the "fault" of the majority, good cause for termination would
be an acceptable business purpose. Thus, the plaintiffs would lose. See, e.g., Priebe v. O'Malley, 623
N.E.2d 573 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993); Reynolds v. Wingers, Inc., 621 N.E.2d 1239 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
102. Topper, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 362.
103. 473 N.E.2d 1173 (N.Y. 1984).
104. Id. at 1176.
105. Id. at 1177.
106. Id. at 1179.
107. Id. at 1178.
108. Id. at 1179.
109. Id.
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investment,""' the court affirmed an order granting dissolution of the cor-
poration unless the respondents bought out the minority's interest."'
In sum, "legislatures and judges today recognize that the structure of the
intimate, illiquid close corporation requires some modification to enable an
investment in such a corporation to be less permanent.". The development not
only of statutory means to define shareholder rights by agreement but also the
widespread acceptance of statutory rights of minority shareholders to cash out
their position". has not been accompanied, however, by a corresponding
acceptance of the majority's ability to compel a sale by a minority."'
C. Cash-Out Mergers
The concern for the minority's inability to escape from the corporation forms
the basis for the Donahue/Wilkes theory of duty and the developing tort of
oppression."5 Without any discussion of the applicability of the liquidity
rationale underlying Donahue and Wilkes, several courts and commentators have
applied a "partnership" fiduciary standard to limit the majority's ability to engage
in corporate transactions which provide for the minority's investment to exit the
corporation at a fair price."6 These decisions demonstrate not only a fundamen-
tally flawed under;tanding of partnership law but also a total absence of any
recognition of the difference between majority conduct which retains the
minority's investment and a transaction which results in payment of a fair price
for that investment."
7
Remarkably, the reluctance to allow the use of mergers to cash out minority
interests in close corporations has persisted despite the development of corporate
codes that allow the minority to force a buy-out"' and recognition that, even
when the majority has been guilty of a breach of duty,"9 the minority
shareholder's interests "are fully protected by liquidating only his interest and
110. Id.
111. Hetherington 8 Dooley argue that these decisions or statutes granting buy-out rights make the
minority worse off than simply allowing dissolution. The position is predicated on the notion that
dissolution is so extreme that the majority will pay a premium to avoid it. Hetherington & Dooley, supra
note 2, at 22-23. Neithe- the authors, nor logic, justify giving the minority a premium.
112. Thompson, Shareholders Cause, supra note 14, at 705.
113. Thompson, Corporate Dissolution, supra note 21, at 231.
114. Murdock, supia note 37, at 440. Recognizing that "[o]bjectively, it may be better that the
parties live apart." The i~sue is then phrased as "may the minority shareholder retrieve the value of her
investment in the corporation?" Professor Murdock is persuasive in advocating continued expansion of
mandatory buy-out remedies, but he appears almost oblivious to the limits the expanded fiduciary duty
puts on the majority's ability to compel a sale.
115. Haynsworth, supra note 11, at 36-37; Thompson, Shareholders Cause, supra note 14, at 739.
116. Johnson, supra note 21, at 21-25.
117. Gabhart v. Gabhart, 370 N.E.2d 345, 353 (Ind. 1977).
118. Murdock,.supia note 37, at 433-36; see, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 2000 (West 1990); N.Y.
Bus. CORP. LAW § 1118 (McKinney 1986).
119. The use of the reasonable expectations standard has allowed courts to mandate buy-outs even
when the complaining rinority is guilty of criminal conduct resulting in his discharge. See Gimpel v.




paying the fair value of his shares while permitting the remaining shareholders to
continue the business."'2 Commentators have continued to urge liberalization
of these statutes to provide buy-outs "not merely where minority shareholders are
the victims of the unfairly prejudicial misuse of control power by majority
shareholders, but also in any circumstances where the minority shareholders are
found to be in deeply embittered or grievously disappointing circumstances."''
Indeed, the initial impetus for the partnership analogy in close corporations was
to justify the use of mechanisms to allow minority withdrawal from the enterprise
and to enhance the liquidity of close corporation investments." By use of "a
jurisprudence of analogy rather than principle,"'" courts have used the analogy
to find a fiduciary duty on the part of the majority not to cash out the minority.
Application of this fiduciary duty/business purpose test to cash-out mergers was
made in Coggins v. New England Patriots Football Club." The court concluded
that this standard "is not limited to close corporationss but applies to judicial
120. 3 MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. § 14.34, cmt. (1994). A "court supervised buy out has
become the predominant form of relief' in involuntary dissolution cases predicated on majority
oppression or other misconduct. Haynsworth, supra note 11, at 53. For an analysis of the valuation of
these interests, see Murdock, supra note 37, at 471.
121. Edwin J. Bradley, An Analysis of the Model Close Corporation Act and Proposed Legislative
Strategy, 10 J. CORP. L. 817, 837 (1985).
122. The law of close corporations is moving to this position with the judicial trend toward ordering
mandatory buy-outs favoring minority shareholder dissolution petitions. The use of this remedy without
any showing of fault by the minority has moved the law much closer to the partnership paradigm. See
WILLIAM L. CARY & MELVIN A. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS 542-43 (7th ed. 1995).
123. Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DuKE L.J.
879. Even the critics of the partnership analogy recognize its value within limits. See, e.g.,
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 49, at 249. Acceptance of the criticism, however, would result
in the application of corporation statutes as the "contract" between the participants. Id. at 236-38; see
also O'Kelley, supra note 3, at 216 n.2. The statutory "contract" clearly permits the use of mergers to
cash out minority interests.
124. 492 N.E.2d 1112 (Mass. 1986).
125. Delaware flirted with the legitimate business purpose test for freeze-out mergers in publicly
traded corporations in Singer v. Magnavox, 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977). This test requires that the merger
promotes a legitimate business purpose separate from the purpose of eliminating the minority
shareholders. Delaware quickly rejected the legitimate business purpose rule in determining the validity
of going private mergers. In Weinberger i UOP, 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) a cash-out merger between
UOP, Inc. and its majority owner, the Signal Companies, Inc., eliminated the minority shareholders of
UOP, Inc. The minority shareholders argued that there was no legitimate business purpose for the merger
as required under Singer. However, the Delaware Supreme Court abolished the need for a legitimate
business purpose and they made the analysis an entire fairness analysis, which requires the evaluation
of the merger on the basis of fair dealing and fair price. Id. at 711. Presumably, this standard would
apply to cash-out mergers in closely held corporations. See Nixon v. Blackwell 727 A.2d 1366 (Del.
1993).
Some states have gone even further. For example, Minnesota had modified the test by eliminating
the "entire fairness" analysis altogether. In Sifferle v. Micom Corp., 384 N.W.2d 503 (Minn. Ct. App.
1986), the directors of Micom Holding Company merged the subsidiary Micom into the parent (Micom
Holding Company) and eliminated the minority shareholders of Micom. The minority shareholders
challenged the "entire fairness" of the transaction. According to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, section
302A.471, subdivision 4 of the Minnesota Statutes does not allow for minority shareholders to challenge
19961
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review of [all] cash freeze-out mergers."'" Believing that "the danger of abuse
of fiduciary duty is especially great in a freeze-out merger, the court must be
satisfied that the fre.eze-out was for the advancement of a legitimate corporate
purpose."'" Because the merger did not serve "any valid corporate objective
unrelated to the personal interests of the majority shareholders," the defendants
breached their fiduciary duty."
The combined fiduciary duty/business purpose test can lead courts to conclude
that cash-out mergers are simply not available.'9 By definition, "in a freeze-out
merger the minority shareholders are being treated in a different manner: the
majority is permitted continued participation in the equity of the surviving
corporation while the minority has no choice but to surrender their shares for
cash." ' ° The result of this reasoning is that a transaction designed merely to
cash out the minority is a breach of duty.'
In Gabhart v. Gabhart," the court confronted the majority's use of a merger
to eliminate the plaintiff from his equity position in a closely held corporation.'
the "entire fairness" of th3 merger, as is permitted under Delaware law. l at 507. Minnesota also does
not allow for a legitimite business purpose analysis, therefore the only remedy that a minority
shareholder in Minnesota can seek is appraisal. See also Persinger v. Carmazzi, 441 S.E.2d 646, 654 (NV.
Va. 1994).
126. Coggins, 492 N.E.2d at 1117. A few other states also retain a "business purpose" standard for
mergers of publicly held companies. See Dower v. Mosser Indus., 648 F2d 183 (3d Cir. 1981) (applying
Pennsylvania law); Valley Nat'l Bank of Arizona v. Trustee for Westgate-Califomia Corp., 609 F.2d 1274
(9th Cir. 1979) (applying California law); Grimes v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 392 F. Supp.
1393 (N.D. Fla. 1974); Klurfeld v. Equity Enters., 436 N.Y.S.2d 303 (App. Div. 1981). Most states,
however, seem to be following Delaware's lead in rejecting this standard. See supra note 125.
127. Coggins, 492 N.E.2d at 1118.
128. ld.
129. The effect oftreating close corporations as possessing unique characteristics creating heightened
fiduciary duties creates t&e specter of two standards for mergers under the same corporation code. For
example, in Ohio the cre of Howing Co. v. Nationwide Corp., 927 E2d 263, 268 (6th Cir. 1991),
vacated on other ground, 502 U.S. 801 (1991), involved a merger of Nationwide Corporation, a
subsidiary, with its parent, Nationwide Mutual. This merger eliminated the minority public shareholders
of the subsidiary. The Sixth Circuit held that as a general rule under Ohio law the majority shareholder
may "cash out" the minority shareholders for any reason so long as the majority shareholders pay a "fair"
price and fully disclose all relevant facts about the value of the corporation whose stock it is buying.
Apparently, Crosby's duty of equal opportunity does not apply to public corporation transactions.
130. Alpert v. 28 Williams St. Corp., 473 N.E.2d 19, 28 (N.Y. 1984); see also Brudney &
Chirelstein, supra note 24, at 1358.
131. See Twenty Seven Trust v. Realty Growth Investors, 533 F. Supp. 1028, 1039 (D. Md. 1982)
("Although the defendants . . . may ultimately show that the merger was for legitimate business
purposes ... whether such is the case cannot be resolved on motion to dismiss."); see also Umstead
v. Durham Hosiery Mills, 578 F. Supp. 342, 345 (M.D.N.C. 1984) ("[P]laintiffs allegation, taken as
true, that defendants intu nded to freezeout the minority shareholders adequately states a breach of
fiduciary duty claim.").
132. 370 N.E.2d 345 (Ind. 1977). In response to the Indiana Supreme Court's decision in Gabhart,
the Indiana legislature enacted section 23-1-44-8 of the Indiana Code. This new statute does not allow
the type of minority sharaholder challenge to corporate action permitted by Gabhart. See Fleming v.
International Pizza Supply Corp., 640 N.E.2d 1077 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).




Although the transaction met all statutory requirements,"M the court understood
the issue to be "whether the majority may force a merger having no corporate
purpose."'35 The transaction resulted from "the use of corporate control vested
in the statutory majority ... to eliminate minority shareholders from the enter-
prise .... 1
As its point of departure, the court noted, "[a]lthough the form of such freeze-
out transaction may vary and is not confined to merger or consolidation, the
policy considerations are generally the same."'37 These policies, however,
appeared to the court to be in conflict.
The case law concerning the validity of mergers effected for no
corporate purpose is dominated by principles of contract and agency.
Those jurisdictions which hold appraisal to be an exclusive remedy
without regard for the underlying purpose of the corporate action tend
to rely on contract principles, stating that the merger statute is part
and parcel of the minority shareholder's contract, and the minority
shareholder has thereby been put on notice that the majority may
unilaterally alter the terms of the minority's investment.
On the other hand, those cases which allow a minority shareholder
to preserve his status, in the absence of a legitimate corporate reason
for change, emphasize agency principles and the fiduciary duty owed
by controlling shareholders and directors to the minority.
Both positions have merit and respectable support, and it would be
unwise to embrace one and to ignore the other.'38
The court resolved this dilemma by concluding that cash-out mergers were
impermissible, but that statutory dissolution was available.'39 According to the
court, this result was preferable because it afforded greater protection to the
minority than simply an appraisal action."
In Alpert v. 28 Williams St. Corp., ' Madison Associates wanted to purchase
Realty Corporation, whose sole asset was an office building. 4 Madison Associ-
ates formed a wholly owned subsidiary, 28 Williams Street Corporation, to act as
the nominal purchaser of the majority shareholders' interests.'43 After completing
the purchase, 28 Williams Street notified the minority shareholders of Realty
134. Id. at 350.
135. Id. at 353.
136. Id. at 353.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 354-55 (citations omitted).
139. Id. at 355.
140. Id. This conclusion is highly questionable. Generally, valuation of the entity as a going
concern will yield a higher price than the liquidation of the business. See Haynsworth, supra note 11,
at 44; see also Murdock, supra note 37, at 441-43.
141. 473 N.E.2d 19 (N.Y. 1984).
142. Id. at 22.
143. Id.
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Corporation that their interests would be excluded through a cash-out merger.'"
Noting that "there exists a fiduciary duty to treat all shareholders equally,""' the
court observed that "[o]n its face, the majority's conduct would appear to breach
this fiduciary obligation."'' 46 Echoing Donahue/Wilkes, the New York Court of
Appeals held that "[i]n the context of a freeze-out merger" the removal of
minority shareholders is permissible only "when related to the advancement of a
general corporate interest."'4 Absent such a purpose, a cash-out merger would
not be allowed.
V Cash-Out Mergers in Light of Fiduciary Duty
and Participants' Expectations
The focus on fiduciary duties and minority expectations has made courts and
commentators blind to the fact that "the danger in a freezeout is that a majority
stockholder who is in fact an insider will force the minority to accept an unfair
price for their interests.""' Cash-out mergers in a closely held enterprise,
however,
generally arise in the context of a dispute over the disentanglement of
what are essentially partnership arrangements .... The parties are
visibly at loggerheads over division of the business's prosperity or
over the ccnduct of its business; their disagreements are of a
continuing kind, likely both not to be resolved until the business
terminates .nd to plague the parties as they remain unable to
disentangle satisfactorily. 49
If the majority chooses to behave in an oppressive manner during this dispute, the
minority can exit at a fair price.
Although a cash-out merger would give rise to a right to an appraisal (and thus
a judicially monitored buy-out at fair value) in every state,"3 courts and
commentators are still reluctant to endorse their use.' For example, the
American Law Institute's effort at developing standards for cash-outs explicitly
excludes application to closely held corporations purportedly because of their
144. Id. at 22-23.
145. Id. at 27-28.
146. Id. at 28.
147. Id.
148. Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 24, at 1364. Remarkably, these authors slip into the same
vested rights fallacy in their desire to prohibit certain going private transactions. In their view, "the
fiduciary principle suggests that... (courts should] interpret corporate statutes ... as not permitting
insiders to unilaterally condemn the stock of public investors when the effect is to leave the public with
no chance to return to tie enterprise." Id. at 1367.
149. Id. at 1356 n.9.
150. Joel Seligman, Reappraising the Appraisal Remedy, 52 GEo. WAsH. L. Rev. 829, 831-33
(1984).
151. Even when courts allow cash-out mergers, they do so grudgingly. See REO Mechanical v.




similarity to partnerships. 5 ' The commentators simply cannot escape the notion
that the law should "allow a shareholder to retain his status until something more
than the majority's desire to be rid of him or to own his shares justifies his
elimination."'53
The right to an appraisal following a cash-out merger, however, provides
protection analogous to buy-out remedies developed in oppression cases."
Recognition of an appraisal action's "proper function as providing a cash exit at
fair value"' 5 makes its use particularly appropriate to remedy liquidity problems
in close corporations. 6 "Actually, appraisal remedies could work for the same
purposes as buyout remedies .... "" The objection to this proposition is that
although appraisal "may protect the value of the shareholder's investment .... it
does not protect those shareholders who would prefer to retain their interest in the
corporation."'5 Thus, at the root of the reluctance to approve cash-out mergers
lingers the concept of a vested right to remain a shareholder, not the fiduciary
duties of a partner nor the expectations of the parties.
A. Fiduciary Duties Owed by Partners
The foundation for the limitation on the majority's conduct in cash-outs is the
analogy to the fiduciary duties owed by partners in a partnership setting.59
Perhaps the most famous interaction of the fiduciary duties of partners was by
Justice Cardozo: "Joint adventurers, like co-partners, owe to one another... the
duty of the finest loyalty .... A trustee is held to something stricter than the
morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the
152. Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations, 2 A.L.I. § 7.25 cmt. a
(1994) ("When a corporation's shares are closely held, shareholders often have relationships with each
other similar to those of partners, and their fair expectation concerning continued participation ... may
be considerably different . . . . Accordingly, § 7.25 [on appraisal] does not address the rights of
shareholders of closely held corporations, which may be more appropriately governed by principles
comparable to partnership law."); see also Note, supra note 6, at 1641-42.
153. Vorenberg, supra note 63, at 1201. Professor Vorenberg believed that appraisal was an
inefficient and ineffective remedy that could not reliably compensate shareholders. More importantly,
in his view "only where there is a plausible business purpose of the corporation beyond the majority's
desire to enlarge their own stockholdings or to eliminate a minority stockholder" should transactions with
those effects be permitted. Id. at 1204.
154. John E. Davidian, Corporation Dissolution in New York. Liberalizing the Rights of Minority
Shareholders, 56 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 24, 46 (1981).
155. Mary Siegel, Back to the Future: Appraisal Rights in the Twenty-First Century, 32 HARV. J.
ON LEGis. 79, 121 (1995).
156. Id. at 120-24.
157. Shishido, supra note 40, at 103.
158. William J. Harmon, Note, Corporation Freezeouts: A New Limitation Imposed by the "Entire
Fairness Standard," 1978 U. ILL. L.F. 686, 696.
159. "If fiduciary relation means anything I cannot conceive a stronger case of fiduciary relation
than that which exists between partners." Helmore v. Smith, 35 Ch. 436,444 (1885); see generally Leona
Beane, The Fiduciary Relationship of a Partner, 5 J. CORP. LAW 483 (1980); Note, Fiduciary Duties of
Partners, 48 IowA L. REV. 902 (1963).
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most sensitive is the standard of behavior.""w In only slightly less encompassing
terms, a leading treatise notes "the main elements of the partners' fiduciary duties
are well recognized: utmost good faith, fairness, and loyalty." '61 When the focus
is narrowed to the acquisition of another participant's interest in the partnership,
however, the scope of these duties is well defined: "The partners' principal
fiduciary duty in the buy-sell situation is that of full disclosure."'"
The Uniform Partnership Act (UPA) contains provisions regarding fiduciary
duties that require all partners to account to the partnership for any benefit
received in connection with the partnership and to hold such benefits as trustee
for the partnership." Under the UPA, partners also have a duty to provide to
other partners "true and full" information, upon demand, of "all things affecting
the partnership."'' Case law has summarized the nature of the fiduciary
relationship among partners defined in the UPA to require each partner to act "in
the utmost good faith" toward the other partner or partners."
These duties, however, do not bar the majority (or even a single partner) from
ending the partnership. Indeed, "[o]ne of the characteristics of a partnership is
freedom of exit. The courts have considered it unwise to keep people in business
together when they want to disassociate."'" Any partner may cause the partner-
ship to cease merely by withdrawing. 1 "[T]he consequences of such an action
depend on whether the dissolution is 'wrongful,' a concept which the UPA treats
as largely equivalent to 'in contravention of the partnership agreement. ' "" In
160. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
161. ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, PARTNERSHIP 6:68 (1994 & Supp. 1995); see alto
Beane, supra note 159, at 497-501.
162. BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 161, at 6:87. Without any partnership analogy, corporate
law consistently required disclosure to minority shareholders in a close corporation of potential valuation
factors prior to the purchase of the minority's stock by the corporation or majority shareholders. See, e.g.,
Weatherby v. Weatherby Lumber Co., 492 P.2d 43 (Idaho 1972); Jacobson v. Yaschik, 155 S.E.2d 601
(S.C. 1967); Shermer v. Baker, 472 P.2d 589 (Wash. Ct. App. 1970).
163. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP Acr § 21(1), 6 U.L.A. 602 (1994).
164. Id. § 20, 6 U.L.A. 256.
165. Wilensky v. Blalock, 414 S.E.2d 1, 4 (Ga. 1992). This concept has been incorporated into
section 404(d) of the RUPA as applying to partners' duty of care and loyalty. REV. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP
Acr § 404(d) (1994). Neither "good faith" nor "fair dealing," however, prohibit self-interested
transactions, id. § 404(e), or bar partners from purchasing at partnership dissolution sales and continuing
the business, id. § 404(t) cmt. 6.
166. Charles B. Blackman, Partnership Precedents in a Corporate Setting - Exit from the Close
Corporation, 7 J. CORP. L. 237, 238 (1982).
167. UNtF. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 31, 6 U.L.A. 771 (1994); see O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 12,
§ 6.05 ("Since a partnership is primarily a consensual relationship and can be dissolved at any time by
any partner ... ease of dissolution avoids in partnerships those injustices caused by corporate squeeze-
plays ... [where the minority shareholder is forced] to leave his investment in the business."). The lack
of such a right to a minority shareholder was thought to be "the decisive distinction between the close
corporation and the partnership." Hetherington, supra note 6, at 11.
168. Robert W. Hillman, The Dissatisfied Participant in the Solvent Business Venture: A
Consideration of the Relative Permanence of Partnerships and Close Corporations, 67 MINN. L. REV.
1, 11 (1982). Despite tha protests of some corporate law observers, see, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL,
supra note 49, at 249-50, "wrongful dissolution" rarely occurs absent a specific duration for the
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol49/iss1/2
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other words, the fiduciary duties of partners do not guarantee continued
participation in the business by any member." Unless the partnership is formed
for a definite duration, "any partner may freely dissolve without breach of
contract and without liability, whatever the motive and whatever the injurious
consequences to co-partners . . . ."' In short, the "existence of the partnership
does not create ... an entitlement or interest in the indefinite or even limited
continuation of the partnership."'
Under either the UPA or the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA), "a
single partner can compel liquidation of the firm at any time.' The RUPA
confirms both the right to withdraw at will and the absence of any right to
continue in the enterprise. The termination of the partnership "is wrongful only
if: (1) it is in breach of an express provision of the partnership agreement; or (2)
in the case of a partnership for a definite term or particular undertaking, before
expiration of the terms or completion of the undertaking.""7
Section 404 of the RUPA describes the General Standards of Partner's Con-
duct. 74 Subsection (a) sets forth the only two fiduciary duties owed by a
partner: the duty of loyalty and the duty of care. 75 These duties run to both the
partnership and the other partners. Subsection (b) limits the partner's duty of
loyalty: "(1) to account to the partnership and hold as trustee for it any property,
profit, or benefit derived by the partner.... ; (2) to refrain from dealing with the
partnership ... as or on behalf of a party having an adverse interest .... ; and
(3) to refrain from competing with the partnership ....,,176 As the comment to
the section makes clear, "those rules are exclusive and encompass the entire duty
of loyalty.""' The Reporters for the RUPA have amplified this point: these
provisions are "specific and exclusive."'7 In other words, courts are not to find
new or different duties derived from the partnership relationship.
Under the RUPA there remains no duty to continue the partnership with all of
its members nor any obligation to refrain from competing for the continuation of
partnership or conduct that would be unlawful even absent the dissolution.
169. This is not to say that a partner has no fiduciary responsibility in regard to the termination.
"In short, having the right to terminate a relationship does not establish the absence of fiduciary
constraints on transactions connected with the termination." DeMott, supra note 123, at 887. These
obligations, however, do not mandate that former partners have a right to continued participation in the
enterprise nor require that former partners be retained in any continued form of the venture.
170. ALAN R. BROMBERG, CRANE & BROMBERG ON PARTNERSHIP 422 (1968).
171. Clapp v. LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & McRae, 862 . Supp. 1050, 1058 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); see also
Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 2, at 41-42.
172. Larry E. Ribstein, The Revised Uniform Partnership Act: Not Ready for Prime Time, 49 Bus.
LAW. 45, 62 (1993).
173. REV. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 602(b).
174. Id. § 404.
175. Id. § 404(a).
176. Id. § 404(b).
177. Id. § 404(b) cmt. 2.
178. Donald J. Weidner & John W. Larson, The Revised Uniform Partnership Act: The Reporters'
Overview, 49 Bus. LAwv. 1, 23 (1993).
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the business of the partnership.' The RUPA specifically states that conduct
which furthers a partner's own interest does not, by itself, result in a violation of
the RUPA or the partnership agreement."' A partner or group of partners is
permitted to purchase all of the dissolved partnership's assets.'
Characterization of the dissolution as simply a forced sale of the minority's
interest does not restrict a partner's ability to eliminate the minority. In Prentiss
v. Sheffe," the Court of Appeals of Arizona adopted the trial court's finding of
facts, which included a finding that there had been a freeze-out of the defendant
from the management and affairs of the partnership." The effect of this
condtct by the majority was to dissolve the at-will partnership and cause the trial
court to order a judicial sale." The defendant requested the trial court to forbid
the plaintiffs from entering a bid at the upcoming judicial sale of the partnership
assets because of the fact that the defendant had been wrongfully excluded from
the affairs of the partnership."5 The trial court refused to do so, however, and
the assets went to the plaintiffs because they were the highest bidders. On appeal,
the defendant claimed that "the sale to the plaintiffs [was] a forced sale of his
partnership interest."" The court of appeals affirmed, however, in spite of the
freeze-out."7 In short, there is "no obstacle against a partner purchasing the
assets of a dissolved partnership and continuing the business.""'
Applied to cash-out transactions in close corporations, "the business purpose
requirement reflect; a conceptual commitment to the notion that the minority has
a right to continued participation.""9 Partnerships, however, are fluid, persona
179. REv. UNIF. PtRTNERSHIP Acr § 404(b)(3) cmt. 2; see id. §§ 602-603, 801(1). At least one
commentator has found the retention of this right problematic. There is, however, no question about the
RUPA's authorization of dissolution at will. BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 161, § 7.01, at 7:14
(Supp. 1995).
180. REV. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 404(e).
181. Id § 404(f) cmt. 6. This technique has long been recognized as a standard cash-out maneuver
in partnerships: "The partner forcing the dissolution buys up the firm's assets on its liquidation ... and
continues the business without the undesired party, probably at the same location .... This procedure
is frequently used. In many instances, it proves to be unimpeachable." O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note
12, § 6.04.
182. 513 P.2d 949 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973).
183. Id. at 951.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 952.
187. Id.; see also Mandell v. Centrum Frontier Corp., 407 N.E.2d 821, 831-32 (Ill. Ct. App. 1980).
Defendants' former partrers had purchased the partnership assets, but the court concluded, "Defendants
here were not excluded from their interest in the partnership. Defendants are entitled to their
proportionate share of tde proceeds of the sale." Id.
188. HAROLD GILL REUSCHLEIN & WILLIAM A. GREGORY, HANDBOOK ON THE LAWS OF AGENCY
AND PARTNERSHIP 34t4 (1979). Of course, section 404(f) of the RUPA now specifically authorizes this
action.
189. Dierdre A. Burgman & Paul N. Cox, Reappraising the Role of the Shareholder in the Modern
Public Corporation: Weinberger's Procedural Approach to Fairness in Freezeouts, 1984 Wis. L. REv.
593, 632 (1984). In certiin situations of highly profitable businesses, the minority may have more than




relationships that, absent express agreement, carry with them no duty to remain
in the business. There is, therefore, no right to continued participation in the
partnership. As a result, application of partnership duties by analogy to close
corporation shareholders should not guarantee a continued equity interest in the
enterprise nor require that the majority have a business purpose beyond
eliminating the minority before such transactions are appropriate.
B. Reasonable Expectations and the Right To Remain a Shareholder
To the extent that the participants' reasonable expectations are to be owners of
an enterprise to which partnership norms apply, they can have no expectation of
a right to continue as an owner. The very norms used to provide liquidity for the
minority's investment compel recognition of the majority's right to cash out the
minority's ownership interest. Moreover, participants in business ventures select
the type of organization they believe best suits their needs."9 By opting to
incorporate, the parties have presumptively made decisions reflecting their
expectations.' "Minority shareholders in close corporations are not necessarily
dependent upon the legislatures and the courts for protection against
freezeouts."'" Given the increased flexibility to negotiate protections for the
expectations of minority shareholders under most modem corporation codes,"
the necessity of imposing limitations on the majority in cash-out transactions
(other than fair compensation for the value of the minority's equity position) is
unnecessary."
Murdock points out, however, valuation of these businesses on some going concern basis adequately
compensates the minority.
190. O'Kelley, supra note 3, at 245-46.
191. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 49, at 250. This has become even more obvious with
the development of Limited Liability Companies and limited liability partnerships. The availability of
alternative business forms to provide investors with limited liability or preferable tax treatment without
incorporating, argues even more strongly for applying corporate norms to the parties enterprise absent
an explicit agreement to the contrary. See O'Kelley, supra note 3, at 246. These newly recognized
entities, of course, present their own set of concerns surrounding majority rights and minority duties. See
Franklin A. Gevurtz, Squeeze-outs and Freeze-outs in Limited Liability Companies, 73 WASH. U. L.Q.
497 (1995).
192. Note, supra note 6, at 1642. Perhaps the simplest way to prevent cash-out mergers (should the
participants wish to do so) is to establish super-majority voting provisions at levels that would prevent
fundamental change absent minority consensus. Modem corporate codes generally allow for such
provisions. See 4 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN., CLOSE CORP. SUPP. § 20 (3d ed. 1996); see also DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 350 (1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-920 (1990); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-301
(1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-31 (1995); TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT. ANN. art. 12.32 (West 1996); Wyo.
STAT. § 17-17-120 (1996).
217. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 710 (West 1990); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-727 (1996); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 79-4-10.21 (1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-10-22 (1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-7-270 (Law. Co-
op. 1995).
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The perceived restrictive nature of general corporate law made it "apparent how
inappropriate traditional corporate norms were"'93 in dealing with the structure
of close corporations." Although initially corporate codes made "no distinction
between the close corporation and the publicly-held corporation,""' the inconsis-
tency of closely held corporation common law has led to the development of a
separate body of legislation designed to address problems unique to the close
corporation.' These problems have been identified as related to the
management and operation of these entities and the relationship of the participants
in these entities to each other."9 The legislative effort has been to allow more
flexibility in mana:gement and more protection from majority "oppression.""
Close corporation legislation has proven to be extremely popular."0' Generally,
those statutes provide a legislative definition of these entities. 2 By choosing
to incorporate as a close corporation in those states which have adopted close
corporation legislation, participants may structure their relationships to provide
greater protection for minority shareholders and avoid the more restrictive general
195. Manne, supra note 13, at 282.
196. The degree to which this assumption underlying modem corporate codes is valid in regard to
one particular close corporation turns on how nearly that entity approximates the archetypical close
corporation. O'Kelley, supra note 3, at 242. This insight, however, does not change the analysis here.
To the extent that the entity would be most benefitted by adopting the flexible options created by the
codes, the failure of the parties to elect these provisions still reflects preemptively rational choice,
Moreover, if these norms are essentially partnership norms, freedom of exit implies no fiduciary duty
as other limitation based on motivation for the majority cash-out merger. To the extent that the close
corporation is more suitably governed by traditional corporate norms, the principle of majority value is
firmly established and the availability of cash-out mergers to the majority, regardless of motive, should
not be in doubt.
197. Symposium, Actions Prejudicial to Minority Shareholders, 52 Nw. U. L. REv. 345,385 (1957).
198. The merit of this approach is not without critics. See, e.g., Dennis S. Karjala, An Analysis of
Close Corporation Legislation in the United States, 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 663 (1989).
199. Id. at 672-77.
200. Thompson, Shareholder's Cause, supra note 14, at 707; Charles W. Murdock, The Evolution
of Effective Remedies for Minority Shareholders and Its Impact Upon Valuation of Minority Shares, 65
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 425, 427 (1990).
201. The development of special close corporation statutes has been extensive. O'Neal, Close
Corporations, supra note 80, at 873-79. At least eighteen states have adopted specific integrated close
corporation statutes. See 4 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT, CLOSE CORP. SUPP. § 55, at CC-71. One
commentator, however, has claimed "the effect of most modem amendment programs dealing with basic
provisions of the corporation acts has been to modify them in the interest of the close corporation. Our
general corporation laws seem to be in the process of becoming general close corporation laws ... "
Manne, supra note 13, at 284. To date, only a small percentage of close corporations have taken
advantage of those acts. See Thompson, Corporate Dissolution, supra note 21, at 226.
202. Delaware's approach is typical. Title 8, section 342 of the Delaware Code Annotated provides
that a close corporation is one in which, in addition to being organized under the aforementioned statute,
complies with all of the following: "1. No more than thirty (30) persons shall hold all of the
corporation's issued sto:k; 2. the issued stock must be subject to at least one restriction on transfer; and
3. the corporation shall not engage in any public offering of its stock." DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, §




corporation laws by ordering affairs under the more flexible close corporation
laws. 3
The premise of those statutes is acceptance of the partnership model of
allowing the participants to structure their relationship as they see fit. The statutes
recognize that "where a private transaction imposes no substantial cost on society
or third parties, the parties to it should be allowed ... to 'make their own deal.'
Government intervention should be limited to the enforcement of private bargains
and . . . reducing the costs of bargaining."2 4 In such a system, the statutes
function only as default rules. 5
Beyond adoption of integrated close corporation provisions, modern corporate
codes contain general provisions that have been modified to facilitate the use of
shareholder agreements in ways particularly appropriate to close corporations. For
example, section 7.32 of the Revised Model Business Corporate Act (RMBCA)
validates a variety of shareholder agreements which offend traditional norms of
corporate governance."° Although located in the general corporation provisions
of the RMBCA, this section focuses on close corporations." In addition to the
states which have adopted the RMBCA,08 many other states have provisions
which are similar."°9 As a result of this greater flexibility, shareholders who
enter into a minority position in the corporation are able to bargain for their rights
in the event that the relationship deteriorates in the future.21
Absent such agreements, the general corporate law norms should apply.
21
1
Although commentators advocating an expectation approach assert that "minority
shareholders should not be understood as having agreed that the venture is to be
203. Hetherington, supra note 6, at 5-10.
204. Ralph K. Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J.
LEGAL STUD. 251, 253 (1977). Although courts "once viewed unusual contractual mechanisms in close
corporations with suspicion .... [they now] enforce whatever the participants invent." EASTERBROOK
& FiscHEL, supra note 49, at 234.
205. Although some proponents of minority "protection" recognize that the provisions of a state's
corporation act function as "default rules," they reference general (not special close corporation) statutes
to argue for the propriety of an enhanced fiduciary duty. See Thompson, Shareholder's Cause, supra note
14, at 729.
206. 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. § 7.32 & cmts. (3d ed. 1996). According to the official
comment to section 7.32,
Section 7.32 also recognizes that many of the corporate norms contained the Model Act,
as well as the corporation statutes of most states, were designed with an eye towards
public companies ... [and therefore] section 7.32 validates for nonpublic corporations
various types of agreements among shareholders even when the agreements are
inconsistent with the statutory norms contained in the Act.
Id. § 7.32 official cmt.
207. Id. § 7.32 & cmts.
208. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 10-2B-7.32 (1996); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:7.32 (1995).
209. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1463 (West 1990); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 620(b)-
(g) (McKinney 1986).
210. O'Neal, Oppression, supra note 2, at 144-46.
211. Nixon v. Blackvell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1380 (Del. 1993); Blount v. Taft, 246 S.E.2d 763, 772
(N.C. 1978).
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operated strictly as a majority-rule entity," '2 these same commentators assert
that this failure to take advantage of these close corporation statutes has more to
do with naivety and trust than intention."3 Explanations for this failure to
contract range from lack of "foresight or... power" ' 4 to negotiate effectively
to lawyer conflict of interest."5 In the words of the leading proponent of the
expectation standard, "when courts apply the principle of majority rule in close
corporations, they often disappoint the reasonable expectations of the minority
participants." '
To the extent that the reasonable expectation standard seeks to enforce
nonwritten shareholder agreements, it is in fundamental conflict with the statutes
making only such agreements in writing enforceable." 7 Moreover, the search for
ex ante expectations in terms of the outcome of specific issues in individual cases
ignores the "signalling effect provided by initial form selection." '6 By deciding
to incorporate and to not adopt statutorily permissible means of limiting majority
control, a closely held business investor's expectation is that general corporate
norms would govern.2"9 In short, "[r]ational investors understand, in general, the
adaptive characteristics and opportunistic risks that normally attend corporate,
partnership, and sole proprietorship form. They adopt a particular form in the
expectation that.. will provide outcomes that are consistent with the investors'
ex ante governance expectations.""
Indeed, "the primary utility of corporation law lies in providing a set of
standard, implied contract terms, . . . so that business firms do not have to
stipulate these terms anew every time they transact . .,21 The use of
212. Bradley, supra note 121, at 840.
213. Id.
214. Brenner v. Berkowitz, 634 A.2d 1019, 1026 (N.J. 1993); see also Thompson, Corporate
Dissolution, supra note 21, at 224.
215. Bradley, supra note 121, at 840; see also Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 2, at 37-38. The
explanations appear to te rationalizations designed to justify judicial intervention. EASTERBROOK &
FISCHEL, supra note 49, at 237, 240-41.
216. O'Neal, Close Corporations, supra note 80, at 884. To the extent that this simply means the
participants think of themselves as "partners," O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 12, § 2.10, it does not
provide any basis for limiting the cash-out merger rights of the majority.
217. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 710 (West 1990); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-727 (1996); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 79-4-10.21 (1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-10-22 (1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-7-270 (Law. Co-
op. 1995).
218. O'Kelley, supra note 3, at 252.
219. See Shishido, :upra note 40, at 95.
If the shareholders made no contract because either they failed to anticipate future
squeeze-outs or they had no incentive to bargain, then they had no idea of what they
would have wanted. When the parties intended nothing and it is impossible to find what
they would have wanted, it is reasonable to come back to the off-the-rack standard, in our
case, corporate law. If the shareholders made no contract because they intentionally
considered that no contract is better than an incomplete contract, they might have wanted
to leave the future open, and expected to rely on corporate law as a standard contract in
cases of dispute.
Id.
220. O'Kelley,.supr2 note 3, at 252.




"reasonable expectations" to limit statutorily authorized majority action that
provides fair value to minority shareholders defeats this function of corporation
statutes.2" Although persons may "enter closely-held businesses in the same
manner as they enter marriage: optimistically and ill-prepared,"' the fact that
the minority either did not or could not bargain successfully for the protection of
these "expectations"' 4 but yet chose to participate in the corporation belies any
notion that in preventing cash-out mergers the court is enforcing anything
remotely related to "express or implied understanding"'m regarding the
minority's right to a continued ownership interest in the corporation.
VL Conclusion
The result of the legislative and judicial developments of the past two decades
is
that minority shareholders are no longer helpless .... The develop-
ment of the concept of fiduciary duties running from those in control
to minority shareholders, the restatement of oppression in terms of
reasonable expectations of minority shareholders, and the development
of a buy-out remedy converges into a vastly changed posture for
minority shareholders.2"
Lost in the urge to protect minority owners in those enterprises, however, has
been the majority's right to cash out the minority's interest. Recognition of the
minority's expectations and the majority's fiduciary duties does not justify this
result. At bottom, nothing supports these decisions but the discredited notion of
vested rights of ownership in the corporation. This doctrine was discarded long
ago in public corporations; its abandonment is long overdue in closely held
companies.
506 (1976); see also Winter, supra note 203, at 259 ("[A] prime function of state corporation codes is
to supply standard terms which reduce transaction costs . . . by eliminating costly bargaining ... 
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 49, at 236-37.
222. O'Kelley, supra note 3, at 247.
223. Murdock, supra note 37, at 426.
224. See Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 558-59 (N.C. 1985).
225. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d at 563.
226. Id. at 484-85. This represents a significant change since Hetherington & Dooley wrote a decade
and a half ago. See Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 2, at 19.
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